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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Joseph Paul Mobley appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In May 2010, a Nampa police officer responded to Mercy Medical Center 
where Laurel Deboi was being treated. (PSI, p.2; Trial Tr., p.215, L.24 - p.216, 
L.15.) Deboi informed the officer that earlier that night, her boyfriend, Joseph 
Mobley, pushed her down, kicked her in the neck and stomach, punched her in 
the face, and put his hands around her neck until she had trouble breathing. 
(PSI, p.2; Trial Tr., p.133, L.11 - p.145, L.5.) The officer observed that Deboi's 
left eye was swollen and black, and that she had bruising on her left arm and 
neck. (PSI, p.2; Trial Tr., p.218, Ls.3-10.) At the hospital, Deboi was treated for 
"[c]onsiderable left-sided facial and periorbital soft tissue swelling and/or 
hemorrhage." (PSI, p.2.) After further investigation, the state charged Mobley 
with felony domestic battery, attempted strangulation, and a sentencing 
enhancement for committing these crimes in the presence of a child. (PSI, pp.2-
3; R., pp.20-23.) 
Mobley's first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury was unable to come to 
a unanimous verdict on any of the charges. (R., pp.50-53.) During its 
deliberations at the second trial, the jury sent the following message to the district 
court: "We're split on one of the charges. How do we proceed with the charge 
we're split on?" (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-10.) The district court replied, "[r]eread 
1 
Instruction 28, Paragraph 6,1 and continue to deliberate." (Trial Tr., p.11, Ls.11-
12.) The district court asked counsel for both parties if either had any objection 
to this course of action, and both parties declined to object. (Trial Tr., p.332, 
Ls.13-17.) 
The jury found Mobley guilty of felony domestic battery in the presence of 
a child but acquitted him of attempted strangulation. (R., pp.84-85.) The district 
court imposed a unified four and one-half year sentence with one and one-half 
years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mobley on probation for 
three years. (R., pp.105-108.) Mobley timely appealed. (R., pp.109-110.) 
1 On appeal, Mobley contends that the portion of the jury instructions referenced 
by the district court stated: "Consult with one another. Consider each other's 
views, and deliberate with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do 
so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you must decide this 
case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration 
of the case with your fellow jurors." (Appellant's brief, p.14.) While the district 
court did so instruct the jury prior to its deliberations (Trial Tr., p.312, Ls.8-14), 
the appellate record does not appear to contain the numbered jury instructions 
actually presented to the jury. Therefore, it is not clear from the record which 
instruction the court was referring to when it asked the jury to review "Instruction 
28, Paragraph 6." Missing portions of the record are presumed to support the 
decisions of the trial court. State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 
334 (1996). 
2 
ISSUE 
Mobley states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court violate Mr. Mobley's right to due 
process when the court provided the jury with a "dynamite" 
instruction upon being informed that the jury was deadlocked as to 
one of the counts in this case? 
(Appellant's brief, p.15.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Mobley failed to show fundamental error in the district court's 
instruction to the jury to review a portion of the previously-given instructions and 
to continue deliberations? 
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ARGUMENT 
Mobley Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The District Court's Instruction 
To The Jury To Review A Portion Of The Previously-Given Instructions And To 
Continue Deliberations 
A. Introduction 
Mobley contends that the district court violated his rights by providing the 
jury with a "dynamite instruction" upon being informed that the jurors were "split" 
on one of the charges. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-23.) Mobley's argument fails 
because he has failed to show that the district court's instructions to review a 
previously-given instruction and to continue deliberation constituted fundamental 
error that would require reversal of his conviction. 
B. Mobley Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error 
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection 
may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." State v. 
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the 
absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is 
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being 
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a 
fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). 
Relief without objection will be granted unless (1) the defendant 
demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights 
were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, 
"without the need for any additional information" including information "as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must 
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demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally 
by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the 
trial court proceedings." kl at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
Because Mobley expressly failed to object to the district court's instruction 
to review a previously-given instruction and to continue deliberation, the Perry 
fundamental error standard applies to his claim of error. Application of that 
standard demonstrates that Mobley has failed to satisfy any of its three prongs, 
and has thus failed to show fundamental error that would entitle him to a reversal 
of his conviction. 
1. The Perry Fundamental Error Standard Applies To Mobley's Claim 
On appeal, Mobley first contends that the Perry fundamental error test 
should not apply in this case because he did not have the opportunity to object 
before the district court responded to the jury's question during their deliberation. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.) Mobley's contention fails because his assumption 
that the district court instructed the jury before notifying counsel is not clearly 
supported by the record. On the contrary, the minutes in the record indicate the 
court sought the input of counsel prior to providing a response to the jury. (R., 
p.81.) In any event, alleged errors that occur before a party has the opportunity 
to object are still analyzed under the Perry fundamental error test. 
The trial transcript reveals the following relevant exchange occurring 
between the district court and counsel for both parties while the jury was 
deliberating: 
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THE COURT: All right. We're again taking up 2010-15105, and 
the counsel are present. And the jury has sent out a question that 
says, "We're split on one of the charges. How do we proceed with 
the charge we're split on?" 
The court has replied, "Reread Instruction 28, Paragraph 6, and 
continue to deliberate." 
If you have any objections to that, make your record. 
[PROSECUTOR]: No objection from the State, Judge 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No objection, Your Honor. 
(Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-18.) 
The court minutes of the same exchange read: 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, each of counsel indicated 
they had no objection to the Court's response to the question of the 
jury. 
The Court provided the written response to the Bailiff for 
delivery to the jury. 
The Court recessed at 1 :03 p.m. to await the verdict of the 
jury. 
(R., p.81.) 
The record thus reveals the likelihood that while the district court informed 
the parties that it had "replied" to the jury, it did not yet actually deliver its written 
response to the jury until after conferring with the parties and giving them the 
opportunity to object. Certainly, Mobley did not request clarification, or object to 
the timing of the district court's instruction to the jury. At worst, the appellate 
record in this case is ambiguous as to when the district court actually instructed 
the jury to review a previously-given instruction and to deliberate further. An 
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appellate court will not presume error. State v. Sima, 98 Idaho 643, 644, 570 
P.2d 1333, 1334 (1977). 
In any event, Mobley has cited no authority for the proposition that a 
defendant is excused from his duty to object, and that the Perry fundamental 
error test does not apply, where the alleged error occurs before the aggrieved 
party has had the opportunity to object. He has therefore waived this issue on 
appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ("A party waives an 
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are 
lacking."). 
Further, Mobley's contention is incorrect. It is a contemporaneous 
objection, not necessarily an objection prior to the alleged error, which preserves 
an issue for appeal. See Perry 150 Idaho at 224-226, 245 P.3d at 976-978. 
Where, for example, a defendant asserts that a prosecutor committed 
misconduct during closing argument, or that a state witness improperly discussed 
a defendant's post-Miranda silence, a defendant must still object following the 
error at issue to preserve the objection. See State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 
_, 285 P.3d 348, 357-359 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 
950-952, 277 P.3d 392, 397-399 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 
181-189, 254 P.3d 77, 82-90 (Ct. App. 2011). Where there is no objection, such 
alleged errors are analyzed under the Perry fundamental error test, even where 
there was no opportunity to object prior to the alleged error. In those instances, 
as in the present case, a party can still object after the alleged error occurs, and 
request that the district court take appropriate corrective measures such as 
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instructing the jury to disregard the error. Mobley has failed to show that the 
Perry fundamental error test does not apply to this case. 
2. Mobley Has Failed To Demonstrate That One Or More Of His 
Unwaived Constitutional Rights Were Violated 
A dynamite instruction "exhorts those jurors holding a minority view to 
reconsider their position." State v. Pullin, 152 Idaho 82, 84 n.1, 266 P.3d 1187, 
1189 n.1 (Ct. App. 2011). In order to avoid jury coercion, Idaho has adopted a 
"blanket prohibition against dynamite instructions." State v. Flint, 114 Idaho 806, 
812, 761 P.2d 1158, 1164 (1988). However, the United States Supreme Court 
has rejected a claim that dynamite instructions are necessarily unconstitutional. 
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 239-241 (1988). Instead, regulations of 
such instructions are based on the United States Supreme Court's supervisory 
powers over federal courts. !9.:_ In order for a defendant to be denied a 
constitutional right through the use of a dynamite instruction, the instruction must 
be coercive. !9.:_; see also Pullin, 152 Idaho at 84-86, 266 P.3d at 1189-1191 
(holding that Pullin failed to satisfy the first prong of the Perry fundamental error 
test because he failed to show actual coercion such that the instruction given by 
the court was unconstitutional.) Therefore, in order to satisfy the first prong of 
the Perry fundamental error test, Mobley must show not merely that the district 
court utilized a dynamite instruction, but that such instruction was actually 
coercive. Mobley has failed to show that the district court utilized a dynamite 
instruction, much less than any such instruction was actually coercive. 
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The court's response to the jury was not a "dynamite" instruction because 
it did not "[exhort] those jurors holding a minority view to reconsider their 
position." See Pullin, 152 Idaho at 84 n.1, 266 P.3d at 1189 n.1. The district 
court did not single out any jurors in the minority of the split, or indicate to the jury 
that it was required to find a verdict. 
The court's response was also not coercive. In State v. Timmons, 141 
Idaho 376, 377-378, 109 P.3d 1118, 1119-1120 (Ct. App. 2005), in determining 
that a district court's deliberation instruction was not coercive, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated that its conclusion drew support from State v. Byerly, 109 Idaho 
242, 706, P.2d 1353 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Flint, 114 
Idaho 806, 761 P.2d 1158. In Byerly, in concluding that the district court's 
comments to a jury during its deliberation were not coercive, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated: 
Here, the judge's comments did not (1) cast any light on the 
merits of the case, (2) did not establish a deadline for reaching an 
ultimate verdict, (3) made no allusions to the undesirability of a 
retrial, (4) made no reference to the time or expense taken to try 
the case, (5) did not insist the jury reveal the numerical division, 
and (6) did not coerce a minority number of the jurors into 
surrendering their conscious conviction or honest beliefs. 
Byerly, 109 Idaho at 245, 706 P.2d at 1356. 
In the present case, the district court's instructions to review a previously-
given instruction and to continue deliberation did not contain any of the elements 
of coercion described in Byerly. Further, the jury in the present case did not even 
declare themselves deadlocked - they merely indicated they were "split on one 
of the charges." (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-10.) Finally, the lack of any objection by 
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defense counsel, despite the district court specifically asking if counsel had any 
objection, also indicates a lack of coercion. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 (lack of 
an objection "indicates that the potential for coercion argued now was not 
apparent to one on the spot"); see also Pullin, 152 Idaho at 86, 266 P.3d at 1191. 
Mobley has failed to show that the district court's response to the jury during 
deliberations constituted coercion, and he has therefore failed to show that one 
or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated. 
3. Mobley Has Failed To Show That Any Alleged Error Was Clear Or 
Obvious, Or That The Failure To Object Was Not A Tactical 
Decision 
For many of the reasons discussed above, Mobley cannot show that any 
constitutional violation was "clear or obvious." Likewise, in failing to object, 
defense counsel may have made a tactical choice to let the jury continue to 
deliberate in hopes that it would acquit Mobley on one or both charges. At the 
point in the proceedings where the jury reported to the district court, it was 
unknown how the jurors were "split" - they may have already decided to acquit 
on the attempted strangulation charge, but were split on the felony domestic 
battery charge. With this a possibility, Mobley's counsel may have been satisfied 
with the way the trial had gone, and concluded that his client had a better chance 
with the present jury than he would have on a re-trial. Mobley's description of the 
facts in his Appellant's brief certainly illustrates, from the defense perspective, 
multiple weaknesses in the state's case. (See Appellant's brief, pp.1-14.) If 
Mobley's trial counsel shared a similar view of the state's case, there is every 
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reason to believe he would have had strong tactical reasons to choose to 
withhold any objection. 
Mobley has failed to show that any alleged error was "clear or obvious," or 
that his trial counsel's decision not to object to the district court's response to the 
jury's question was merely a tactical decision. Mobley has therefore failed to 
meet the second prong of the Perry fundamental error analysis. 
4. Mobley Has Failed To Demonstrate That Any Alleged Error 
Affected The Outcome Of The Trial Proceedings 
Finally, Mobley has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the 
district court's response to the jury's question during their deliberation affected 
the outcome of the trial proceedings. Mobley's assertion that his conviction to 
felony domestic battery was the result of pressure from the district court to reach 
a verdict is entirely speculative. First, it is unknown when the jury unanimously 
determined to convict Mobley of felony domestic battery - this determination may 
have occurred before the jury even informed the district court that it was split on 
"one of the charges." Even if the district court did improperly pressure the jury, it 
may have pressured them into acquitting Mobley of attempted strangulation. 
Second, while it appears that the jury came back with its verdict only about an 
hour after the judge replied to its inquiry, the jury had only been deliberating for 
about one and one-half hours prior to reporting its "split" to the district court. (R., 
pp.80-81; Trial Tr., p.331, L.12 - p.332, L.10.) Thus, there is nothing in the 
timing of events at the trial proceeding that would support Mobley's assertion that 
the court's response affected the outcome of the trial. Finally, for the reasons 
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discussed above, the district court's response to the jury's question was simply 
not "coercive" - there is therefore no reasonable likelihood that its response 
affected the outcome of the trial. 
Mobley, who must satisfy all three prongs of the Perry fundamental error 
analysis, has failed to meet any of them. He has therefore failed to show 
fundamental error in the court's instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Mobley's judgment of 
conviction for felony domestic battery. 
DATED this 29th day of January, 2013. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of January 2013, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
MWO/pm 
MARK W. OLSON "' 
Deputy Attorney General 
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